Paying attention to the Construct Of Salience In Identity-related Literature and Beyond by Anderson, H. & Matheny, J.
Ide
Hele
 Paying Attention To The 
Construct Of Salience In 
ntity-related Literature and 
Beyond  
 
 
 
n Anderson and Jonathan Matheny
  
Paper 11-2004
ISSN 1176-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAYING ATTENTION TO THE CONSTRUCT OF 
SALIENCE IN IDENTITY-RELATED LITERATURE AND 
BEYOND  
 
 
 
 
Helen Anderson and Jonathan Matheny  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 © - Copyright of the Author(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
Helen Anderson 
Staff Central Co-ordinator 
Staff Services 
Auckland University of 
Technology 
Private Bag 92006  
Auckland 1020 
New Zealand 
Tel: +64-(0)9-917-9999 x8983 
e-mail: helen.anderson@aut.ac.nz 
Dr. Jonathan Matheny 
Postgraduate Group 
Faculty of Business 
Auckland University of 
Technology 
Private Bag 92006  
Auckland 1020 
New Zealand 
Tel: +64-(0)9-917-9999 x5600 
e-mail: jonathan.matheny@aut.ac.nz 
 
 
 
The opinions and views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of 
AUT of the General Editor or Review Panel of Enterprise and Innovation. 
 
Printed by Sprint Print, Wakefield St., Auckland, NZ
AUT AUTHORS 
 
 
 
HELEN ANDERSON 
Helen has completed a Bachelor of Business (1st Class Honours) with AUT's Faculty 
of Business.  She gained provisional admission to the Faculty's PhD programme in 
2004.  Her research focuses on the interaction of identity and attention-related 
interpretation processes in a context of organisation change.  She currently works 
with Staff Support in AUT's Staff Services Division. 
 
DR. JONANTHAN MATHENY 
Jonathan Matheny is a Senior Lecturer serving in the Postgraduate Programmes 
Group at the Auckland University of Technology.  He earned a PhD in Management 
from the University of Rhode Island, an MBA in Strategic HRM from the University of 
Connecticut, and a Bachelor of Science in Psychology from Texas A&M University.  
He has taught at leading universities around the world and presented research in 
international journals and leading academic conferences.  His research interests 
include employee interpretation processes as they relate to organisational change 
and a variety of micro-organisational topics such as leadership, motivation, conflict, 
and stress. 
 
  
PAYING ATTENTION TO THE CONSTRUCT OF SALIENCE 
IN IDENTITY-RELATED LITERATURE AND BEYOND  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reviews the salience construct, proposing a definition of salience as a 
phenomenon of connection between a stimulus and a person. Our framing of the 
salience construct includes its elements, temporality, and several ontological 
perspectives of salience. In answer to calls for clarity in the use of concepts in the 
identity-related literature, this framing is applied to Identity Theory and Social Identity 
Theory. We find each theory unclear in its use of salience, the naming of the 
elements of salience and the ontological perspective of salience. The importance of 
gaining clarity in defining and using salience is the contribution to answering 
questions inherent to identity theories, namely ‘Is an identity triggered by an object of 
salience, or does the active identity determine which objects of salience gain 
attention?’ Research propositions based on the proposed definition of salience and 
the results of the analysis are offered. The implications a precise definition of 
salience has for identity-related literature and micro-organisational theories, such as 
leadership and motivation, are briefly outlined.  

INTRODUCTION 
The notion of salience underpins much of what we know about work, workers, and 
management. While Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton (2000, p.13) note that identity and 
identification are ‘root constructs’ of organisational literature, we believe the construct 
of salience is even more fundamental. It could be claimed that micro-organisational 
theories such as organisational identification, leadership, motivation, teamwork and 
so on, rest on the implicit notion that a person’s interpretation of and response to the 
environment depends on what is salient for that person at a given moment. Here are 
three quick examples of the supporting role salience plays across micro-
organisational literature. 
 
 In the leadership literature, Urch Druskat and Wheeler (2003) found that 
outstanding leaders might be those that effectively manage salience across 
team boundaries. Such leaders appear able to successfully manage the 
salient connections made between information, teams, and individuals across 
an organisation.  
 In the motivation literature, Pratt and Rosa (2003) observed that certain new 
forms of organisations gain motivation from members by focusing their efforts 
to build commitment of members on non-work significant others, particularly 
family. From a salience perspective, this suggests that such organisations 
have identified stimuli that are salient to their members and used it to gain the 
benefits of a motivated and committed workforce. 
 In the identification literature, Pratt (1998) stated that two central research 
questions are how and when identification with an organisation occurs. Pratt 
notes that identity theories fail to explain fully how people choose their targets 
of comparison and so why certain identities are salient at some times and not 
at others. Precise use of salience may help explain the nature of the salient 
connections between people and organisations, defining what a salient 
stimulus, the target for identification, might be, and when and how an 
individual’s identification with this target might occur. 
 
From each of these examples, scholars and practitioners tend to engage in the 
topical literature (leadership, identification, etc.) without fully considering the 
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underlying construct of salience. As these three examples suggest, the construct of 
salience permeates this literature, but receives little direct attention. This paper is an 
attempt to develop further the construct, and intends to contribute to making 
salience’s definition and use more explicit and exact.  
 
We begin by providing a fundamental framing of salience. This conceptualisation 
of salience is applied to two identity-related theories: Social Identity Theory and 
Identity Theory. The following questions highlight issues related to the use of the 
salience construct in general, and more specifically, to the use of salience in identity-
related theories:  
 
 From the multiplicity of stimuli available to a person, what determines the 
object of salience that occupies an individual at any given moment?  
 From the multiplicity of identities available to a person, what determines the 
active identity from which an individual operates at any given moment?  
 Fundamentally, answering these two questions provides insights regarding the 
reciprocal question of identity: Is an identity triggered and governed by objects 
of salience or does the active identity determine which objects of salience gain 
attention? 
 
We begin with a literature review in three sub-sections. First, we consider 
‘salience’ in depth, developing an ontological framework to depict its use in a range 
of literatures. Basic reviews of Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory conclude 
this section. The analysis section provides a point-by-point application of our salience 
framework to Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. The following discussion 
identifies three implications of the analysis and a set of propositions stemming from 
the framework developed. This paper provides new perspectives to the construct of 
salience, the identity-related literature, and other organisational literatures relying on 
the construct of salience.  
 
 
SALIENCE 
Our treatment of the construct salience is iterative. We take three passes at the topic, 
each subsequent treatment providing greater depth. We begin with a look at 
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definitions and some common meanings implied when using the construct. We then 
provide our own definition of salience and use the three points of that definition to 
guide further consideration of the construct. This initial subsection of the literature 
concludes with a graphic representation of our salience framework — the framework 
we then employ throughout the remainder of the paper.  
 
COMMON DEFINITION AND MEANING OF SALIENCE 
In a recent psychology text, Smith and Mackie (2000) suggest that salience refers to 
a cue’s ability to attract attention in its context. Pryor and Kriss (1977) note that 
something is salient when it receives a disproportional amount of attention from the 
observer in relation to its context (p. 39). McArthur (1981) suggests that salience can 
be used interchangeably with ‘figural’ and ‘attention-drawing’ (p. 201). ‘Figural’ refers 
to the Gestalt concept where a figure stands out from its context or background in the 
perception of the observer (Koffka, 1935). McArthur (1981) explains that ‘attention-
drawing’ stimuli stand out from their background due to possessing certain inherent 
characteristics. Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998) also emphasis the inherent attention 
drawing aspects of a salient stimulus as ‘the intensity of a feature, the extent to which 
it presents a high amplitude signal in relation to background noise, in a way that is 
fairly independent of context’ (p. 193). Higgins (1996) defines salience as comprising 
the natural prominence and comparative distinctiveness that draws attention 
selectively to a specific object. There ‘are relatively invariant natural properties of 
objects that increase the likelihood that attention will be drawn selectively to them’ 
and ‘an object’s properties in comparison with the properties of other objects in the 
immediate situation can also draw attention selectively to that object’ (Higgins, 1996 
p. 156-157). As these examples illustrate, the few direct definitions of salience that 
do exist tend to define salience as the capacity of a stimulus to gain a person’s 
attention, particularly in relation to the context.  
 
The limited number of straightforward definitions of salience pales in 
comparison to ‘understood’ definitions derived from the term’s widespread use. More 
times than not, when the construct of salience is used, it appears in exchange for 
another word, thus providing a de facto definition. For instance, Savitsky, Gilovich, 
Berger, and Husted Medvec (2003) suggest that a person’s absence from a group 
‘may not be especially salient or noteworthy to others’ and ‘people are very salient 
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and important in their own eyes’ (p. 387). Following their logic, salience appears 
related to, but perhaps not the same as, noteworthy and important. At other times, 
writers use parentheses to explain their meaning of salience. For example, Hogg and 
Terry (2000a) state that one’s cognitive structure ‘brings into active use (i.e., makes 
salient) that category rendering the social context and one's place within it 
subjectively most meaningful’ (p.125). Similarly Pratt (1998) states that organisational 
identification is likely to occur ‘where boundaries between one’s own organization 
and other organizations are salient (i.e., categorizations are clear)’ (p. 191). In these 
common phrasings, additional words and explanations are required to make the 
author’s meaning of salience clearer for the reader.  
 
These uses of combinations of synonyms and abbreviated explanations, 
suggest authors need (or at least need to employ) a more precise understanding of 
salience. We propose that the treatment of salience is clarified when the uses of the 
salience, the elements of salience, and the ontological perspectives on salience are 
made clear. We now turn to deepen our treatment of these three points by examining 
the uses, elements, and ontological perspectives of salience evident in the literature. 
 
USES OF SALIENCE 
Our review suggested three common use of the term salience: salience as a quantity, 
as a catalyst, and as a connection.  
 
Salience may be used as a quantity that something possesses. For instance, 
working from the literature on attitudes1, Scott (1968) uses salience to describe the 
intensity with which a person holds the focus of an attitude. Similarly, Sargent and 
Williamson (1958) referred to salience as the amount of intensity with which an 
attitude is felt. These writers appear to have viewed salience as something that may 
be quantified according to the amount of attention it garners.  
 
Second, salience can be thought of as a turning point – a catalyst for change. 
For instance, Berscheid, Graziano, and Monson (1976) used salience to describe the 
event when one person’s attitude toward another person changed. The trigger for 
attitude change was the moment one person noticed their dependence on another, 
and so attended to them (Berscheid et al., 1976). The contact hypothesis uses 
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salience in relation to how peoples’ attitudes change when they have contact with 
others (Pettigrew, 1997). If individuals have contact on an interpersonal level with a 
member of another group, while remaining aware of the salient differences between 
their groups, they come to make more positive generalisations of the other person’s 
group, changing their attitudes towards the other person and their group (Hewstone, 
2003; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). A central point in Taylor and Fiske’s (1978) review is 
that people readily use the salient information in their environment. People respond 
with little thought to salient stimuli in their environment, quickly changing their 
attitudes toward others as a result (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). In this perspective, people 
have salient moments of attitude change.  
 
Other authors use salience as a phenomenon of connection. For instance, 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) considered salience to be the point at which a stimulus 
captures attention relative to other stimuli in the context and the individual’s 
expectations. Earlier, Krech & Crutchfield (1948) reported research showing how 
attitudes prominent in a person’s cognitive field readily connected with certain salient 
thoughts and so were more likely to be spontaneously mentioned. Used in this 
sense, salience represents a moment of connection between the person and a 
stimulus. Table 1 summarises the uses of salience as a quantity, as a catalyst of 
change and as a connection.  
 
Uses of salience 
Quantity 
Salience can be thought of as the amount of attention grabbing relevance possessed by a stimulus. 
Catalyst of change 
Salience can be thought of as the extent to which a stimulus is capable of causing a moment of change. 
Connection 
Salience can be thought of as the phenomenon of connection between a stimulus and a person. 
Table 1: Uses of Salience 
 
ELEMENTS OF SALIENCE 
The uses of salience outlined identify two elements that must be addressed in any 
application of the salience construct: the stimulus and the person.  
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For our purposes, a salient stimulus is anything that is salient at a point in time. 
Salient stimuli range broadly from physical artefacts such as desks to psychological 
constructs such as memories and thoughts. Salience is something about a stimulus 
‘that draws attention specifically to a specific object of perception or thought’ 
(Higgins, 1996). While some theorists suggest that there is little difference between 
perceiving people and inanimate objects (Heider, 1958; McArthur, 1981), Fiske and 
Taylor (1991) emphasise that people and their behaviour differ from inanimate 
objects, particularly in the capacity for their actions to impact on other people, and so 
tend to be salient stimuli. Visual stimuli are likely to be salient stimuli, particularly if 
novel, bright, complex and moving and in the person’s proximity (Berlyne, 1958; 
McArthur & Ginsberg, 1978; McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Salancik 
and Conway (1975) manipulated the ease with which a person retrieved memories of 
past behaviours, and found that the person’s attitude altered to be consistent with the 
cognitions that had recently gained attention. McGuire et al. (1978) observed that 
salient aspects of self-concept were those personal features perceived as different 
from other people in that person’s environment. Essentially, whatever gains one’s 
attention, be it an object, person, or cognition is a salient stimulus.  
 
Prior to describing our conception of the person in salience, we need to 
differentiate the constructs of attention and salience. Uttal (2000) observes that 
attention is difficult to define, and suggests attention may be best expressed as a 
mental process or function, which is essentially ‘an interpersonally observable 
property of what is an unobservable intrapersonal mental activity’ (p.102). James 
(1890) noted that ‘Focalization, concentration, of consciousness’ are the essence of 
attention (p. 404) and differentiated between the sensory attention driven by the 
stimuli in our environment and the volitional attention we direct toward stimuli. We 
suggest that attention refers to a concentration of mental activity leading to or 
stemming from the moment of salience. A person interacts with a stimulus by either 
responding passively to a salient stimulus, or directing their attention to the stimulus.  
 
In summary, we suggest that the stimulus element of salience can be either 
psychological or physical and that the person either directs or responds their 
connection with the salient stimulus. Figure 1 summarises the elements of salience.  
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The elements of salience 
Physical artefacts Stimulus Psychological constructs 
   
 Connection  
   
Passive observer Person Directed attender 
Figure 1: The elements of salience 
 
In the next section, we elaborate an ontological framework of salience.  
 
ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF SALIENCE 
The following review of salience-using literature is organised along an objective-
subjective continuum of ontological assumptions (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). To 
maintain clarity, we present the objective and subjective perspectives separately and 
describe moderate positions between the extremes. Figure 2 provides a graphical 
overview of our ontological continuum of salience. The overlapping arrows reaching 
toward opposing positions represent the use of the continuum to explain salience 
through perceptual, contextual, and stimulus-related elements.  
 
 
Objective
Salience
Subjective
Salience
Stimulus Salience explained in combination with Contextual and Knowledge Factors 
Perceptual Salience explained in combination with Stimulus and Contextual
Factors 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A continuum of salience 
 
OBJECTIVE SALIENCE 
Working from the objective pole, we identify stimulus salience when a stimulus 
connects with the person through possessing inherent attention-grabbing 
characteristics. At the objective extreme, this position assumes that a stimulus has 
concrete, objective characteristics that gain attention independent of the other stimuli 
in the contextual field and independent of the person’s psychological make-up. The 
person is at the extreme of being a passive observer. Less extreme objective 
positions on the continuum suggest that a stimulus possesses objective 
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characteristics but gains attention in relation to other stimuli in the contextual field 
and/or in relation to the observer’s perception.  
 
Stimulus salience refers to the innate capacity of a stimulus to connect with an 
individual and gain their attention. For instance, in operant conditioning experiments2, 
salience described the inherent property of a stimulus to gain a response from a 
subject due to possessing a ‘degree of conspicuousness or obviousness’ 
(Mackintosh, 1977; Sternberg, 1998, p. 235). More recently, Theeuwes (1994) 
presented research arguing that visual attention is captured in a stimulus-driven 
manner. A salient stimulus gains attention, regardless of the attentional set of the 
person, due to its possession of certain properties, such as colour or an abrupt onset. 
Salience in this sense refers to the inherent objective characteristics of the stimulus.  
 
Other theories identify salience stemming from the properties of a stimulus, but 
consider that observation of a stimulus as salient is related to the stimulus standing 
out in its context. Sloman et al (1998) for instance, notes that the brightness of a 
bright light is salient in terms of ‘the intensity of a feature, the extent to which it 
presents a high amplitude signal in relation to background noise, in a way that is 
fairly independent of context’ (Sloman et al., 1998, p. 193). Attention-drawing stimuli 
may stand out due to their colour, brightness, size, movement, novelty, and nearness 
to the person (Erber & Fiske, 1984; McArthur, 1981; Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 
1975). For instance, the black swan of Tchaikovsky’s famous ballet Swan Lake gains 
attention because every other dancer on stage wears white. There is nothing about 
the black costume itself that demands attention. Moreover, the naive observer would 
see little relevance in the black costume in the absence of all the others wearing 
white.  
 
A person seems to respond to one stimulus rather than another due to a pattern 
they observe related to the properties of the stimuli itself in its context. Game theory 
notes that individuals have non-random behaviour because certain characteristics 
rather than others ‘stick out’, suggesting themselves (Grant & Quiggin, 1998; Mehta 
& Starmer, 1994). Heads tend to be more salient in relation to tails when choosing 
the outcome of a coin toss (Mehta & Starmer, 1994). McArthur (1981) notes that 
stimuli draw attention due to unit-formation connecting with shared infrequency, for 
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example, connecting the infrequent appearance of a minority ethnic group with 
infrequently observed behaviours. These uses of salience are not confined to the 
inherent properties of a stimulus but are also connected to the contextual field where 
that stimulus appears. 
 
The objective characteristics of a stimulus may be salient in relation to the 
observer’s psychological structure and content. Cognition theory uses salience to 
refer to the connection that a stimulus makes with something else in the contextual 
field the observer knows. For instance, most people quickly connect an apple with 
their knowledge that apples grow on trees (Sloman et al., 1998). Research in the 
cognition of language uses salience in this ‘connecting’ sense. Research in 
conceptual noun combinations uses salience to refer to features that tend to be 
interpreted with a similar meaning (Bock & Clifton, 2000). For instance, stripes are a 
salient feature that is highly defining of the word tiger, so people are likely to interpret 
a noun combination of tiger mouse as a mouse with stripes (Bock & Clifton, 2000). 
So, salient stimuli easily access and connect with related stimuli of which a person 
already has knowledge. 
 
OBJECTIVE SALIENCE AND THE USES AND ELEMENTS OF SALIENCE 
Objective salience is used from a perspective of the world as external to the 
individual, where salient stimuli capture a person’s attention in stimulus-driven 
manner. The attention-grabbing properties of a salient stimulus tend to be seen as an 
observable, measurable quantity. The person is in a position of passivity - noticing a 
stimulus’ because of its inherent properties. At the less extreme end of this side of 
the continuum, the person’s psychological content and structure make connections 
between their existing knowledge and the objective properties of the stimulus.  
 
SUBJECTIVE SALIENCE 
Working from the subjective pole, we identify perceptual salience when a stimulus 
gains attention through the observer’s subjective projection of relevance or 
connection. At the subjective extreme, the characteristics of salient stimuli exist as 
perceived by the observer. Less extreme positions toward the subjective end of the 
continuum allow that the characteristics of a stimulus and a broader contextual field 
exist but that their meaning and relevance is perceived through the observer’s eyes 
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and influenced, for instance, by his or her attentional tasks, prior knowledge, and 
expectations (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
 
Subjectively salient stimuli have characteristics determined largely in relation to 
the observer’s psychological structure and content. The categories a person holds 
can determine whether a stimulus is perceived as salient. Salient stimuli may be the 
focus of deliberate connection due to either contrasting with or being associated with 
an individual’s experience. Bargh (1996) suggests attention can be attracted to 
salient objects automatically when an event is usual and experienced before and fits 
the individual’s existing mental structures for that event, situation, or person. Hoffman 
and Singh (1997) show that the shapes of certain objects are salient, not due to any 
inherent physical characteristic, but due to connecting of the shape with the 
categories of memories people hold. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note that 
memories increase the ease by which a certain stimulus is ‘brought to mind’ (p. 27). 
For instance, after having a car accident a person more easily notices news reports 
of car accidents. Erber and Fiske (1984) note that a salient social stimulus may be 
the focus of attention due to being relevant to an individual’s goals. For instance, a 
senior manager is widely perceived to have more influence on one’s future than a 
colleague. In the context of managing stakeholder relationships, Agle and Mitchell 
(1999) note that it is the manager’s perception of a stakeholder’s attributes rather 
than the stakeholder’s actual attributes that make the stakeholder salient to that 
manager. Salient stimuli also may contrast with people’s prior knowledge and 
expectations. This form of perceptual salience tends to be extreme, such as people 
behaving in unexpected ways (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Vaughan 
& Hogg, 1998).  
 
Salient stimuli can be attention grabbing because such stimuli are relatively 
distinct, peculiar, and rare in the social context, as suggested by distinctiveness 
theory. This theory adds that a stimulus is also salient because individuals perceive 
themselves possessing and sharing the rare, peculiar, and distinct characteristics of 
the stimulus (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 
1998; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). When the individual perceives a stimulus as 
salient, they also perceive the distinctive and rare stimulus as descriptive of 
themselves.  
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What an individual notices as distinctive about him or herself changes according 
to their context. For instance, an African American woman in a group of Caucasian 
American women may think of herself as black, but when moving to a group of 
African American men, becomes more conscious of herself as a woman (McGuire et 
al., 1978). According to social cognition theory, salience depends not only on the 
stimulus’ features that capture attention, but also on the perception of the individual 
of the stimulus’ distinctiveness relative to other stimuli in the context (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). A perceptual stimulus that is salient relative to the immediate context is often 
novel compared to the other stimuli in the context (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For 
instance, disabled people in a wheelchair are salient in the context of a group of 
people who can walk.  
 
SUBJECTIVE SALIENCE AND THE USES AND ELEMENTS OF SALIENCE 
The uses and elements of salience from the subjective view emphasise the salience 
of a stimulus as subjective, existing within the psychological constructs of the person. 
A salient stimulus may be a psychological construct, such as a memory, that exists in 
a person’s mind, independent of the context. Perceptual salience emphasises the 
person as deliberate rather than responsive as the salience of a stimulus is based on 
his or her psychological content and structure.  
 
SUMMARY  
Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the elements of salience and the 
subjective and objective views of reality. The contrasts and continuums between 
objective salience and subjective salience and responsiveness and deliberateness 
are pictured with the explanations of salience mapped according to their intersection 
with each continuum. At the objective extreme, a stimulus is salient through 
possessing attention-gaining characteristics. At the subjective extreme, salient stimuli 
exist as perceived through the connection the perceiver makes between subjectively 
perceived stimuli and their psychological structure and content. The interrelationship 
between subjective and objective salience is shown in the less extreme positions 
where interaction exists between the person, the stimuli, and the context.  
 
 
 11
  Responsive  Deliberate
  Passive  
observer 
 
Directed
attender
O
bj
ec
tiv
e 
St
im
ul
us
 
sa
lie
nc
e 
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context and observer 
 
Stimuli have objective 
characteristics that stand out in 
the contextual field in relation to 
other stimuli creating patterns in 
the attention of the observer 
 
Stimuli have objective 
characteristics that are 
salient in relation to the 
observer’s psychological 
structure and content 
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tiv
e 
Pe
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tu
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sa
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e 
 
Stimuli have subjective 
characteristics determined in 
relation to the contextual field 
Salient stimuli have 
subjective characteristics 
determined in relation to the 
attender’s psychological 
structure and content 
   Context  
Figure 3: Continuums of salience 
 
Distinguishing between the less extreme positions on the continuums, where the 
objective or subjective salience of a stimulus exists in relation to the contextual field 
helps identify where lack of clarity about salience exists in the literature. The central 
difference is that one explanation views the stimulus as objective, that is, as having 
inherent attention grabbing properties that connect with the person. The other 
explanation views the stimulus as subjective, perceived through the person’s 
psychological content and structure. The similarity between both explanations is the 
function of the context in providing a field for comparison and contrast. The next step 
in bringing clarity is to propose a definition of salience. Aspects of this definition have 
been inferred in the previous review. Following the proposed definition, we provide 
more detail of the components of the definition, and the uses, elements and 
ontological perspective of salience. It is proposed that: 
 
salience can be defined as a connection between a stimulus and a 
person that exists at a moment of time.  
 
This definition includes the significant elements of salience, takes a position on 
the temporal quality of salience, and accommodates a range of ontological positions 
of salience. First, the definition simply includes the two primary elements of stimulus 
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and person. While the ‘context’ of a salient moment is important, the context needs to 
be considered subsequent to the connecting of the primary elements of stimulus and 
person.  
 
Second, the definition introduces a temporal quality to salience, emphasising 
salience as a phenomenon that exists at a specific moment of time. It can be argued 
that this limits the construct of salience to one-off moments. But, taken to the 
extreme, this conceptualisation suggests that people live in a series of salient 
moments where a ‘moment’ might be no more than a split second. In this sense, 
taking an explicit position on the momentary nature of salience provides both clarity 
and an empowering foundation for understanding micro-behavioural processes (i.e. 
interpretation, motivation, leadership, etc.) as they unfold moment-to-moment.  
 
Finally, this definition is capable of encompassing a continuum of objective to 
subjective explanations of salience. From a concrete objective view of reality, the 
inherent characteristics of a physical stimulus gain connection. At the other extreme, 
the stimulus subjectively connects in relation to the person’s psychological structure 
and content.  
 
In summary, our definition proposes a construct of salience as: 
 
 a connection between a stimulus and a person 
 a phenomenon existing at a moment of time and from moment to moment 
 a phenomenon existing on a continuum from objective to subjective views of 
reality 
 
This framework and definition is a step towards bringing clarity to the construct of 
salience, providing a means of analysing the use of the salience in identity-related 
literature. We have already suggested that two well-known identity theories, Social 
Identity Theory and Identity Theory, appear to fail to explain clearly their treatment of 
salience and the processes of determining an active identity. The elements of each 
theory are introduced to complete the literature review.  
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 IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
Comparisons of Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory are becoming 
commonplace and are usually accompanied by suggestions for or rejections of 
integrating the two theories (Deaux & Martin, 2003; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; 
Stets & Burke, 2000; Thoits & Virshup, 1997). In application of our framework of 
salience, we extend the comparison in a new direction. We believe that better 
understanding of how each theory treats salience could enhance the use of each 
theory. On the other hand, a more precise understanding of the construct of salience 
may present an alternative approach to possible integration of the theories.  
 
Restating the questions raised in the introduction serves to remind us of the 
relevance of salience to identity theories. We began by asking whether an identity 
was triggered and governed by objects of salience or does the active identity 
determine which objects of salience gain attention? Salience is key in how each 
theory explains what identity a person may be in at a point of time, with that active 
identity framing the perceptions and actions of that person. Following are brief 
introductions to Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. An analytical discussion 
follows, evaluating each theory’s use of salience in light of the analytical framework 
of salience described in the first half of the paper and summarised in Figure 3.  
 
IDENTITY THEORY  
Identity Theory (IT), a microsociological theory with origins in symbolic interactionism 
and role theory, describes how people exist connected to the multiple and complex 
networks of relationships that comprise society (Deaux & Martin, 2003; Hogg & 
Ridgeway, 2003; Hogg et al., 1995; Stets & Burke, 2000; Stryker & Stratham, 1985; 
Thoits & Virshup, 1997). The theory comes from the perspective that society is stable 
and organised, as people occupy positions in their own network of relationships, with 
each position attached to a role that has its own set of socially expected behaviours 
(Callero, 1985; Stryker & Burke, 2000; Thoits & Virshup, 1997). Reflecting the 
interdependent but differentiated nature of society, a person’s self is composed of 
multiple identities – the internalised expectations of a person’s roles (Burke & Tully, 
1977; Stryker, 1968; Stryker & Burke, 2000; Stryker & Stratham, 1985; Turner, 1978).  
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In Identity Theory, a person’s social reality is negotiated and developed as he or she 
interacts with others (Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Through socialisation, people learn the 
role behaviours expected of them from others’ behaviours toward them, coming to 
internalise, that is, define their ‘self’, according others’ responses to them (Burke & 
Reitzes, 1991; Burke & Tully, 1977; Charon, 1992; Stryker, 1959). Stryker (1959, p. 
116) sets this out:  
 
We come to know what we are through other’s responses to us. Others supply 
us with a name, and they provide the meaning attached to that symbol. They 
categorise us in particular ways — as an infant, as a boy, et cetera. On the basis of 
such categorization, they expect particular behaviours from us; on the basis of these 
expectations, they act toward us. The manner in which they act toward us defines our 
“self,” we come to categorize ourselves as they categorize us, and we act in ways 
appropriate to their expectations  
 
In the course of social interaction, people become able to communicate with 
each other in a society using the shared symbolic meanings of words or gestures 
(Stryker, 1959; Thoits & Virshup, 1997). As individuals share the meaning of 
symbols, they become able to take on the perspective of other people (Mead, 1934). 
The self is able to consider performing a behaviour, imagine others’ response to that 
behaviour, and then behave according the reactions they expect from others. Mead 
(1934) called the self who does the experiencing and thinking and acting the ‘I’, and 
the self who takes the perspective of others, the ‘me’. ‘I’ and ‘me’ are views of one’s 
self, that is, who I am in my own eyes and who I am in other’s eyes (Thoits & 
Virshup, 1997). 
 
An identity salience hierarchy and commitment to identities are used by identity 
theory to explain how a person manages the numerous identities stemming from the 
many social networks to which he or she might be connected. Each individual holds a 
hierarchy of identities of varying salience, with the identities that have the most 
salience being those with a higher probability of enactment across a wider variety of 
situations or with a higher probability of enactment in a certain situation (Stryker, 
1968; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Commitment refers to the extent an individual’s 
relationships with others in their social network depend on their possession of a 
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certain identity and the performance of the behaviours of the associated role (Callero, 
1985; Hogg et al., 1995; Stets & Burke, 2000; Stryker, 1968; Stryker & Burke, 2000; 
Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Identities with more commitment are more prominent in an 
individual’s salience hierarchy.  
 
In summary, Identity Theory views identities as developing through social 
interaction. Through social interaction, people develop shared interpretations of the 
behaviours associated with a position or a role that exists in a social network. This 
shared interpretation of behaviours provides the capacity to evaluate one’s intended 
and actual behaviour from the point of view of others. Identities are the internalisation 
of the expectations of a person’s role-related behaviour that stem from this evaluation 
of one’s self. 
 
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY  
In comparison with Identity Theory’s stable, organised view of society, Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) originates from a conflict-based perspective where people are seen as 
capable of pursuing social change through actively seeking group memberships that 
provide personal advantage (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Deaux & Martin, 2003; Hogg et 
al., 1995; Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Similarly, the ‘self’ is seen as variable 
and dynamic. In fact, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty (1994) doubt that ‘the 
idea of self as a relatively fixed mental structure is meaningful or necessary’ (p. 458) 
and defines the self as a conduit mediating between the environment, a person’s 
psychological constructs, and their behaviour. Social Categorisation Theory (SCT) is 
an extension of Social Identity Theory that details the cognitive and motivational 
bases people use to perceive their membership of certain groups (Deaux & Martin, 
2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hogg & Terry, 2001; Hogg et al., 1995; Hogg & Williams, 
2000).  
 
Social Identity Theory 
The primary insight of SIT is explaining how people come to view themselves as 
members of a group rather than individuals (Thoits & Virshup, 1997). SIT suggests 
that people have intrinsic needs to maintain a positive view of themselves, so they 
make intergroup comparisons and engage in strategies to maintain a positive 
evaluation of their group memberships. 
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 A social identity is the individual’s perception that they belong to a distinct category or 
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A social identity is more than an individual’s cognition 
that they are a group member but is ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 
1978b, p.63). Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999) reiterate these three 
components of social identity as cognitive (one’s awareness or knowledge of group 
membership), emotional (one’s sense of emotional involvement with a group) and 
evaluative (the value connoted by group membership). Accordingly, a social identity 
is when a person knows they are a member of a group, feels like a member of the 
group, and values their membership of that group.  
 
Evaluation involves comparing the in-group a person perceives they belong to, 
with out-groups that they perceive have different characteristics from their in-group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Belonging occurs as people perceive themselves as sharing 
certain similar characteristics with their in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 
1994). Out-groups are salient, gaining the individual’s attention, when perceived by 
the individual as contrasting with their in-group, due to having characteristics that are 
different and distinct from the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
 
Intergroup social comparison are underpinned by an individual’s motivation to 
maintain a positive view of themselves (Hogg & Williams, 2000; Turner, 1975, 1982). 
Motivations related to evaluating group membership include the need to reduce 
uncertainty about one’s place in society, and the need to promote self esteem by 
belonging to a group that is both distinct from and evaluated positively in comparison 
to other groups (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Hogg & Terry, 2000b; Kramer, 
1991; Tajfel, 1978b; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If a group fails to meet such needs, 
individuals engage in various strategies such as altering their perception of their 
membership of the group or disassociating themselves from the group (Ellemers et 
al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The expanded model of social identity similarly 
suggests individuals actively promote a positive self-concept by disidentifying or 
maintaining ambivalent identification with a group (Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Kreiner, 2002; Pratt, 2000, 2001).  
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 In summary, social identity is integrally related to individuals’ needs to improve 
their social position through seeking to identify with, that is, perceive membership of, 
positively evaluated groups.  
 
Self-categorisation theory 
Self-categorisation theory developed to address the cognitive details of how an 
individual actually perceives himself or herself as a member of a certain group or 
category (Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Reicher, & Wertherell, 
1987; Turner et al., 1994). Self-categorisation is the cognitive process that occurs as 
the external category of the group is transformed into internal definitions of the self 
(Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1994). The category of a group is presented as a 
prototype, a set of characteristics stereotypic of a typical group member, that defines 
and prescribes the attitudes, feelings, and behaviours that characterize one group 
and distinguish it from other groups. Through a process of self-stereotyping, where 
the individual compares him or herself to the group prototype, the individual 
depersonalises, defining him or herself less in terms of individual attributes and more 
in terms of the shared prototypical group characteristics (Hogg & Williams, 2000; 
Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994). The term 
salience is used in SCT to describe the likelihood of the individual assigning the 
characteristics of the group prototype to themselves (Oakes, 1987).  
 
SCT proposes the salience of group membership is an outcome of the 
interaction of motives, accessibility, and fit that predict when people define 
themselves in terms of a group prototype (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1997). Motives 
include those connected to social categorisation, particularly self-esteem promotion 
and uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Terry, 2000b; Hogg & Williams, 2000). 
Accessibility includes contextual accessibility, that is, the availability of the group in 
the proximate perceptual field, and the ease of accessing certain social categories in 
memory (Oakes, 1987). Fit refers to how well the characteristics of the group account 
for the person’s existing knowledge of similarities or differences between groups of 
people, as well as explaining the actual behaviour of the people observed (Oakes, 
1987). Interestingly, Hogg et al. (1995) note the attempt to explain inter-group as well 
as intra-group processes places SIT and SCT nearer sociological theories. 
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In summary, SCT details the process by which an individual comes to define 
himself or herself as a member of a certain social group. Salience is used to explain 
how a combination of factors works together to influence the moment of 
depersonalisation.  
 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
THEORY 
We now apply the framework of salience to Identity Theory and Social Identity 
Theory. Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory are compared according to each 
theory’s use of salience, their approach to the elements of salience and their 
ontological assumptions toward salience.  
 
Uses of salience in Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory 
To recap, three uses of salience were identified in the literature: a quantity something 
possess, a catalyst for change, and a connection. Connection takes either an 
objective perspective, where a stimulus’ inherent attention grabbing properties gain a 
response from a passive observer, or a subjective perspective, where a person’s 
psychological content and structure make a deliberate connection with a stimulus.  
 
Uses of Salience in Identity Theory 
 Identity Theory literature mainly uses salience as a quantity, with lesser emphasis on 
salience as a catalyst for change. Quantity is used in at least three ways to explain 
the salience of identities. First, an identity more prominent in the identity salience 
hierarchy has a greater probability of being invoked and its role-related behaviours 
enacted. Identity Theory researchers measure the salience of an identity using the 
frequency with which role behaviours are observed (Callero, 1985; Caste & Burke, 
2002). Secondly, identities more prominent in the hierarchy have a greater quantity of 
‘something’ that increases the probability of that identity being enacted. Commitment 
is proffered as that ‘something’ identities possess and is quantified using the 
proximity, number, and importance of the relationships connected with an identity 
(Callero, 1985; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Stryker and Burke (2000) state that 
‘commitment is measurable by the costs of losing meaningful relations to others, 
should the identity be foregone’ (p. 286). Commitment provides the quantity of 
salience, and the quantity of commitment prioritises identities (Stryker and Burke, 
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2000). The third way Identity Theory uses salience as quantity is by suggesting 
identities have varying quantities of salience, may be simultaneously active. A person 
may be acting according to an identity high in the salience hierarchy, but at the same 
time a lesser identity might be activated by stimuli in the environment (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001; Ashforth et al., 2000).  
 
This points to how Identity theorists also use salience in terms of a catalyst for 
change to explain how one switches between identities (Ashforth et al., 2000). 
However, Stryker (1968) acknowledges that the ‘invocation of an identity’ (p. 560) 
triggered by a stimulus is a rare event. Stets and Burke (2000) employ the catalyst 
use of salience to explain the activation of identities less prominent in the salience 
hierarchy as a supplemental explanation to the use of salience as quantity (as 
measured by commitment). In summary, Identity Theory emphasises salience as a 
quantity allocated to an identity. There is less use of salience as a catalyst, and these 
uses appear to emphasise the person as responsive, with situational stimuli invoking 
the connection.  
 
Uses of Salience in Social Identity Theory. 
Social Identity Theory emphasises salience as a connection, with use of salience as 
a catalyst of change. Salience as connection corresponds with SIT’s use of inter-
group comparison. Tajfel and Turner (1979) originally suggested that a group was 
salient when an individual evaluated the group as attractive and sought to perceive 
themselves as members of this group. As a person makes comparisons between the 
groups in their environment, they make salient connections of membership with the 
groups they seek to belong to (Turner et al, 1994). Depersonalisation combines 
salience as connection and a catalyst of change. On perceiving of prototype of the 
group as salient, a person ceases considering himself or herself as an individual and 
perceives him or herself as fitting the prototypical characteristics of the salient target 
group (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1994).  
 
There are suggestions of salience as quantity emerging in recent applications of 
Social Identity Theory. For instance, Hogg (2001; Hogg & Terry, 2000a) suggests 
that a group is more or less salient according to the degree members conform to the 
group prototype. Previously Ashforth and Mael (1989) had suggested that conflict 
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between identities is resolved by compartmentalising one identity from another. 
Turner et al (1994) described self-categorisation as a continuum of competition 
between multiple personal and social identities with one identity emerging as 
dominant. The suggestion of depersonalisation as a matter of degree rather than as 
a change seems to depart from the original tenets of the theory, and may reflect an 
imprecise use of salience. In summary, Social Identity Theory primarily uses salience 
as a catalyst and as connection, to explain intergroup comparison and the moment 
when an individual depersonalises.  
 
SUMMARY. 
Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory both use salience as a force underlying the 
activation of an identity. Yet, they approach the use of salience quite differently. 
Identity Theory primarily uses salience as a quantity allocated to identities prioritised 
in an identity hierarchy, while Social Identity Theory’s core concepts of social 
comparison and depersonalisation emphasises salience as connection to explain 
how a person comes to perceive that they are member of a certain group.  
 
Elements of salience in Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory  
We identified two elements of salience: a stimulus and a person. A person’s 
connection with stimuli can range paying attention to stimuli possessing inherent 
attention capturing features to stimuli that are perceptually salient due to the 
connection made with categories, schema, and memories.  
 
Elements of Salience in Identity Theory. 
Identity Theory uses the self and self-representing behaviour as salient stimuli. 
People can ‘step outside’ of themselves, direct their attention at their own self and 
evaluate their behaviours (Burke, 1980; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1959). People reflect 
on their behaviour as ‘the feedback to the self of the consequences of the processes 
that are the self’ (Burke, 1980p. 20). The theory’s behavioural feedback model 
suggests people monitor and compare feedback on their behaviour according to their 
perception of their identity standard, that is, their definition of the appropriate role-
related behaviours for a certain situation (Burke, 1980; Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Cast 
& Burke, 2002). Other people’s responses to one’s role related behaviour is 
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environmental stimuli that may also be salient, particularly if from people closely 
linked with one’s social network (Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Callero, 1985; Cast & Burke, 
2002). 
 
Identity Theory tends to acknowledge that stimuli are deliberately connected 
with the individual using their psychological content and structure. Stryker and Serpe 
(1994) suggest that identities act as ‘cognitive bases for arriving at definitions of 
situations in which persons find themselves’ (p. 18). Burke and Reitzes (1991) also 
see individuals as actively attempting to perceive that the feedback on their 
behaviour is consistent with the identity standards to which they are committed. 
People are seen as engaging in deliberateness, interpreting a stimulus according to 
the prioritising of their identities (Stryker & Serpe, 1994). However, as noted above, 
to the degree that a stimulus is capable of cuing the identities that are enacted 
(Ashforth et al., 2000; Stets & Burke, 2000; Stryker, 1968), Identity Theory 
accommodates elements of responsiveness where the person is a passive observer 
to the change in active identity.  
 
In summary, Identity Theory has a mixed use of the elements of salience. A 
person may interpret the salient stimuli of one’s own behaviour and other’s behaviour 
but also certain objective stimuli in the environment can override this interpretation, 
catalysing a change in active identity.  
 
Elements of Salience in Social Identity Theory 
In contrast to Identity Theory’s focus on the salience of behaviour, salient stimuli, as 
used in Social Identity Theory, can be understood in terms of categories. Social 
categories are the groupings of people that a person perceives share similar 
characteristics (Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Categories reflect the tendency 
people have to divide and organise their world according to the cognitive 
representations they already hold (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Lin & Murphy, 1997). 
Similarly, in self-categorisation theory, Turner et al (1994) describe the connection 
between the person’s psychological constructs and their perception of categories in 
their environment as ‘social contextual definitions of the perceiver, definitions of the 
individual in terms of his or her contextual properties’ (p. 458). In each line of 
thinking, the person is a directed attender to stimuli in the form of categories.  
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Although there is this emphasis on a person’s subjective perception of stimuli, 
Social Identity Theory fluctuates on whether the salience of stimuli originates from 
the context or the individual’s perceptions. Turner (1982) suggested that an 
individual’s context might cue an identity. Self-categorisation then seemed to stress 
that stimuli are not salient in themselves, but are subjectively perceived as salient 
due to connecting with a person’s psychological content and structure (Oakes, 1987; 
Turner et al, 1994). While this connection may give the appearance of situational 
variability, Turner et al. (1994) explains that the ability of a person to change the 
category they connect with varies dynamically with their personal perceptions of 
stimuli. In other words, the person engages in a ‘flexible, constructive process of 
judgement and meaningful inference in which varying self-categories are created to 
fit the perceiver's relationship to social reality’ (Turner et al.,1994, p. 458). The 
capacity of individuals to dynamically change their conception of their self in relation 
to their comparative context is supported in research cited by Turner et al (1994), 
Kawakami and Dion (1995) and Spears et al. (1997). Recently Hogg (2001) and 
Hogg and Terry (2000a) note that social identities are responsive to immediate social 
contexts. One of Oakes’ (1987) components of salience, accessibility, suggests 
categories are salient if they are both accessible through being proximate and visible 
in the individual’s context and if they are in the individual’s memory. The theory notes 
interplay between a person’s psychological constructs and their response to an 
objective environment. Thus, there are suggestions of responsiveness and the 
person as a passive observer.  
 
Summary 
There are both similarities and differences in Identity Theory and Social Identity 
Theory. The primary difference lies in what stimuli receive attention. Identity Theory 
suggests salient stimuli tend to be behavioural feedback from one’s self and others 
whereas Social Identity Theory suggests salient stimuli take the form of categories. 
The primary similarity, and it is substantial, lies in the role of the person. Both 
theories tend to view the connection as deliberate, suggesting the person directs 
their attention to the salient stimuli. Finally, both theories maintain a degree of 
ambiguity regarding the responsiveness of the person, particularly in relation to a 
stimulus cuing a shift in identity.  
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ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
THEORY  
We suggested that explanations of salience are arranged along a continuum of 
objective to subjective ontological assumptions. The continuum indicates that 
explaining salience involves a web of perceptual, contextual and stimulus factors. 
Stimulus salience sits with the concrete, objective view of reality, while perceptual 
salience reflects a view of the world as subjectively perceived. Identity Theory and 
Social Identity Theory appear to both be positioned more subjective side of the 
continuum, but the exact ontological perspective of salience in each theory is not 
always clear.  
 
We begin by outlining how each theory appears to view social reality to help 
reveal the underpinnings of the approach to salience. Identity Theory takes a view of 
society as stable, structured, and organised (Stryker & Stratham, 1985; Thoits & 
Virshup, 1997). While role theory, a root theory of identity theory, is criticised for an 
objective inert view of society, symbolic interactionism tends to be placed at the 
juncture between objective and subjective views of reality (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; 
Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The theory views the social world as a relatively concrete 
reality that may be identified, studied, and measured, while at the same time 
acknowledging that the world is open to change through the interpretations and 
actions of individuals (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
 
Social Identity Theory is located further to the subjective side of the continuum, 
reflecting the theory’s more dynamic view of society and its origins in explaining inter-
group competition (Hogg & Ridgeway, 2003; Thoits & Virshup, 1997). The theory 
appears to originate from a tradition that examines the interaction between the 
individual’s subjective evaluation of their place in society and the wider structures 
that exist in society (Deaux & Martin, 2003; Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Turner et al. (1994) express how people dynamically construct and reconstruct their 
self in relation to their social context. Similarly, the social constructivist perspective 
describes a subjective reality where the ‘social world is a continuous process, 
created afresh in each encounter of everyday life as individuals impose themselves 
on their world’ (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, p. 494). More recently, Gergen (2003, p. 
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153) notes that we continuously move through life, facing new challenges and 
contexts and in each new location or context a ‘reformation of self but for different 
purpose’ occurs.  
 
Ontological position of salience in Identity Theory 
Identity Theory’s treatment of salience reflects the theory’s spanning of subjective 
and objective views of reality. Writers using Identity Theory express both objective 
and subjective views of salience, which could contribute to lack of clarity in the 
theory's use and explanation of salience.  
 
Identity Theory seems to use salience in terms of the more central locations on 
the continuum where salience exists in relation to stimuli that have characteristics 
that stand out in the contextual field. The salience of stimuli is noted as subjectively 
determined in relation to a person’s context, interpreted by the organisation and 
content of the individual’s identities (Stryker, 1968; Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Cast and 
Burke’s (2002) recent version of Identity Theory’s behavioural feedback model shows 
that the salient stimuli of behaviour are perceived in the environment according to the 
individual’s psychological constructs. The information the individual receives from 
their behavioural interaction with others leads them to adapt their behaviours, 
adjusting their definition of their identity standard and their expectations of their own 
and other’s behaviour. On the other hand, stimuli in the environment are seen as also 
having characteristics that activate a response a, invoking an identity and the acting 
out of role behaviour appropriate to the situation (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Ashforth 
et al., 2000; Stryker, 1968).  
 
Accordingly, we see a mixture of subjective and objective views of salience in 
Identity Theory. The view that the salience of behavioural stimuli in the person’s 
context is interpreted subjectively according to that person’s psychological content 
and expectations exists alongside the view that environmental stimuli can also 
activate an identity.  
 
Ontological position of salience in Social Identity Theory 
Unlike Identity Theory, where there is a mixture of objective and subjective 
ontological assumptions of salience, Social Identity Theory appears more on the 
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subjective side of the continuum, ranging between moderate and extreme subjective 
views of salience. However, recent uses of Social Identity Theory appear to be 
bringing an objective aspect to the theory’s use of salience.  
 
At the less extreme subjective end of the continuum, Social Identity Theory 
uses salience to refer to stimuli that have subjective characteristics in relation to the 
individual’s contextual field. Individuals perceive themselves as belonging to a certain 
group in their context when they subjectively perceive that they share characteristics 
with a certain group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Depersonalisation reflects how a 
moment of salient connection contributes to the individual subjectively defining 
themselves according to the prototype of a certain group (Turner et al., 1987; Turner 
et al., 1994). Hogg and Terry (2001) describe how an individual’s cognitive system, 
motivated to reduce uncertainty and enhance self-esteem, ‘matches social categories 
to properties of the social context and brings into active use (i.e. makes salient) that 
category which renders the social context and one’s place within it subjectively most 
meaningful’ (p. 7). Salience is explained in terms of the comparisons individuals 
make between the groups in their context, subjectively perceiving similarities and 
differences between groups that make a group a salient stimulus with which the 
individual connects.  
 
There are suggestions of a more extreme subjective view in Social Identity 
Theory – where salient stimuli have subjective characteristics determined in relation 
to an individual’s psychological structure and content rather than in comparison with 
their contextual field. In other words, social categories are subjectively perceived as 
salient according to the individual’s imaginative projection of their reality. This view 
also emphasises a person’s ‘deliberateness’ in managing their connection with 
stimuli. Tajfel and Turner (1979) describe how people appear to engage in social 
creativity strategies if they perceive themselves as unable to move from a less 
desirable to a more desirable group. Such perceptual strategies may include creating 
different dimensions for comparing groups and changing their perception of the value 
of group members’ common characteristics. Ellemers et al. (2002) note that creative 
perceptual coping responses include perceiving a context of individual heterogeneity 
rather then group similarity.  
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In contrast with Social Identity Theory’s emphasis on a subjective view of salience, 
recent work using this theory appears to use salience in a more object manner. For 
instance, Hogg and Terry (2000a) suggest that changes in members of organisations 
may come about by manipulating the presence of the groups used for comparison in 
the organisational context. Stimuli in the context seem to be seen as having objective 
characteristics that can be changed to manipulate the salient connection with 
organisational members. Organisational identity-related literature may be taking an 
objective view of salience. 
 
In summary, Social Identity Theory appears to have a subjective view of 
salience, showing that salient stimuli are either subjectively perceived in relation to 
the context or in relation to the person’s psychological content and structure.  
 
Table 2 compares the uses, elements, and ontological assumptions of salience 
in Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. The table presents a brief, although 
perhaps oversimplified, summary of each theory’s view of salience, highlighting 
differences between the theories. The table also suggests a tool for analysing other 
theories’ use of salience.  
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  Identity Theory Social Identity Theory 
Uses 
of 
salience 
 Central use of salience in 
terms of ‘quantity’ such that the 
position an identity holds in a 
hierarchy of identities determines 
the probability that the particular 
identity is activated. 
 Secondary use of salience 
as a ‘catalyst’ such that a salient 
stimulus can activate an identity 
lower in the hierarchy of 
identities. 
 Central use of salience in terms 
of ‘connection’ such that people 
engage in social comparison. 
 Central use of salience in terms 
of ‘catalyst’ as through 
depersonalisation an individual 
perceives membership of the target 
group.  
 Secondary use of salience in 
terms of ‘quantity’ as depersonalisation 
is considered a degree of conformity to 
the target group.  
Elements 
of salience 
 The focal stimuli are roles 
and self-representing 
behaviours. 
 The person is a directed 
attender, actively seeing cues 
with relevance to self.  
 The person may also be a 
passive observer in light of 
stimuli capable of evoking 
another identity.  
 The focal stimuli are the 
categories that used to organise the 
world. 
 The person is a directed 
attender, deriving categories and 
understanding through his or her 
framework of categories. 
 The person may also be a 
passive observer, responsive to his or 
her immediate social context 
Ontological 
position 
of salience 
 Mixed representation of 
objective and subjective views of 
salience in the literature.  
 Predominantly a subjective view 
of salience in the literature marked by 
recent movement toward an objective 
position.  
Table 2: Salience in Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory 
 
DISCUSSION  
We suggest that both Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory lack clarity and 
consistency in their conceptualisation of salience. Further, because the theories 
seem to have unclear explanations and inconsistently use salience, recent theorising 
has become ‘fuzzy’ in its use of salience. We draw on two examples to illustrate — 
Hogg’s (2001) application of Social Identity Theory to leadership and Ashforth’s 
(Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Ashforth et al., 2000) use of Identity Theory to explain 
the appearance of simultaneous identities and shifts between identities. Finally, we 
suggest that precisely defining salience as a moment-by-moment phenomenon of 
connection between a person and a stimulus distinguishes salience itself from 
precursors and outcomes of salience.  
 28
  
A LACK OF CONSISTENCY  
The analysis highlights areas where Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory lack 
consistency and clarity in their use of salience according to the ontological 
framework. To evaluate the results of the analysis we consider how well each theory 
answers our initial questions regarding the nature of identity, particularly whether an 
identity is triggered and governed by objects of salience or whether the active identity 
determines which stimulus is salient. Lack of clarity and consistency appear in at 
least three related areas: 1) the naming of salient stimuli and the use of the term 
‘salience’; 2) the use of salient stimuli as either subjective or objective and 3) whether 
the person-stimulus connection is one of ‘responsiveness’ or ‘deliberateness’.  
 
Each theory appears to have an unclear approach to naming salient stimuli. Our 
analysis suggests that Identity Theory uses the behaviour of oneself and of others as 
the salient stimuli. The behavioural feedback model developed Burke is the clearest 
presentation of behaviour as a salient stimulus (Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Cast & 
Burke, 2002). As the person is connected with the behaviour of their self and others, 
they adapt their active identity and its associated role related behaviours. However, 
writers in the theory do not seem to name the behaviour as the salient stimulus. 
Rather, salience is seen as the potential or probability of enacting the behaviours 
related to an identity. Identity Theory seems to be quantifying a potentially salient 
stimulus, rather than naming salience itself. The identity that is acted out tends to be 
named the salient identity, but it is the behaviour, rather than the identity itself, that is 
the salient stimulus.  
 
Social Identity Theory, on the other hand, seems clearer in that categories are 
the salient stimuli, but it is the overuse of the words salient and salience that clouds 
the construct’s use. Social Identity Theory has two uses of salience - salience as 
connection and a catalyst of change. Social Identity Theory names the connections 
that occur when an individual makes intergroup comparisons as salience. An in-
group or an out-group may be salient when the person is making a connection with a 
group as they evaluate and compare groups. A person’s social identity is also salient 
when it connects and changes through depersonalisation with a certain group 
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prototype through the self-stereotyping process. This use of salience as a catalyst of 
change does not tend to be named salience in the theory, but rather the heuristic of 
salient identity is used. In addition, salience is used to refer to the potentiality of a 
group to be a salient stimulus, that is, the capacity of the group to invoke 
depersonalisation. Oakes (1987) defines this potentiality of salience as the 
combination of motives, accessibility and fit. Resulting from these multiple uses of 
salient and salience in the theory, each time the construct appears in social identity 
literature, one needs to consider whether salience is referring to the change that is 
the outcome of depersonalisation, the capacity of categories to invoke 
depersonalisation, or the connection a person is making with in-groups and out-
groups. 
 
The second and third areas lacking clarity and consistency are related. Each 
theory seems inconsistent on whether salient stimuli are on the objective or 
subjective side of the continuum. In Identity Theory, a person perceives and 
interprets subjectively salient stimuli (behaviour) in their context using their 
psychological constructs (called identity standards (Burke & Reitzes, 1991; Cast & 
Burke, 2002) or identity schemas (Stryker & Serpe, 1994)). Also, objective stimuli in 
the context may at times invoke an identity and so role behaviours, in response. 
However, while Identity Theory’s mix of objective and subjective salient stimuli 
reflects the theory’s origins, the suggestion that identities may be simultaneously 
active due to one being perceptually salient and the other activated by objective 
stimuli conflicts with the proposed definition of salience as connection between a 
person and a salient stimuli that exists at a certain moment.  
 
As Social Identity Theory is more firmly located on the subjective side of the 
continuum, the lack of clarity over explaining the connection with stimuli as a passive 
response or as a deliberate perceptual connection is more inconsistent. The theory 
emphasises subjective aspects of salience, for instance, a group category is salient 
when a person subjectively perceives a connection with that category. Turner et al 
(1994) asserts that depersonalisation with categories changes with the context, with 
categories being the individual’s perceptions of ‘social contextual definitions of the 
perceiver’ (p. 458). In other words, using our framework, the person perceives the 
salient stimuli of categories according to their subjective perception of their broader 
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contextual field. However, recently the theory has been used to support suggestions 
that people respond to objective stimuli in their context and that altering the stimuli 
used for social comparison can cause people to change the groups they perceive as 
salient (Hogg & Terry, 2000a).  
 
In summary, we could suggest that the theories are not always clear or 
consistent in explaining the nature of the connection between a person and a 
stimulus, particularly whether a person responds to a salient stimulus or whether a 
person subjectively determines the stimuli they subjectively connected.  
 
An illustration  
Reflecting this unclearness, recent use of salience seems to have become ‘fuzzy’. 
Two recent articles provide illustration. Hogg (2001) proposes a Social Identity 
Theory of leadership as a group process arising from depersonalisation and social 
categorisation. Hogg suggests groups become more or less salient according to the 
extent group members conform to and are influenced by the group prototype. In other 
words, salience appears used as a variable quantity, rather than a connection or 
catalyst of change. The use of salience as ‘more or less’ departs from the 
categorising basis of SCT, where the person changes at some point to a social 
identity where they perceive similarities between their group as greater than 
differences between their group and other people at a certain point of time. Although 
Ashforth and Johnson (2001) claim to use SIT, SCT and IT, their approach reflects 
Identity Theory’s hierarchy of identities. Ashforth and Johnson (2001) dispute that 
only one identity at a time is activated and suggest identities might be simultaneously 
salient or some identities even constantly salient. They propose two forms of 
identities – those that are subjectively important, that is, highly relevant to one’s 
values and goals, and situationally relevant, that is, socially appropriate to a given 
situation. The subjectively important identity may be almost continuously present 
although not always active. The situationally relevant identity is used in the 
appropriate situation.  
 
Building on our analysis of IT and SIT in relation to salience we might suggest 
that these articles are examples of using salience in indeterminate ways. Hogg 
(2001) emphasises self-stereotyping processes and the change of depersonalisation 
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as subjective perceptual processes, but then refers to salience as a quantity that 
there can be more or less of. Ashforth and Johnson (2001) suggest that salience 
varies in quantity, can be distributed amongst identities, and is activated either 
objectively as required by a situation or subjectively according to the individual’s 
psychological constructs and their perceptions of their context. Ashforth and Johnson 
seem to be trying to explain how people seem to display simultaneous identities. We 
suggest that the phenomenon they might be attempting to take account of, but in too 
coarser terms, is the moment-by-moment changes in connections between an aspect 
of one’s self, or an identity, and salient stimuli.  
 
DISTINGUISHING THE PHENOMENON OF SALIENCE – IMPLICATIONS OF A 
SALIENCE FRAMEWORK 
Finally, we suggest that precisely defining salience as a moment-by-moment 
connection between person and stimulus distinguishes the phenomenon of salience 
from its precursors and outcomes. Some of the variety observed in the use of 
salience, may be due to the phenomenon itself being ‘mixed up’ with factors that 
might lead to a certain salient connection and the outcomes of this connection. For 
example, Identity Theory defined salience as the probability of identities being 
activated – this suggests a view of salience as a precursor to a salient connection. In 
Social Identity Theory, salience as the combination of motives and accessibility and 
fit detailed by SCT refers to the combination of conditions that might lead to a salient 
connection with a certain category or group, not the moment of connection itself. In 
summary, there are several implications of this analysis of salience in relation to 
Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory.  
 
A first implication 
One obvious implication is that writers can use the framework to question, re-assess, 
and make clear their position(s) regarding salience. Specifically, writers need to 
consider whether they are treating salience as something that can be quantified, 
something that invokes a change, or something that is a connection. Writers also 
need to make clear what is the stimulus and what is the nature of the connection 
between the stimulus and a person – is it deliberate, shaped by the person’s 
psychological constructs, or has the person’s attention been captured by objectively 
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salient stimuli. Finally, writers need to consider and make clear their ontological 
stance toward salience, endeavouring to gain consistency.  
 
A second implication 
This last point provides us with our second implication – questioning and re-
examining the treatment of salience could contribute to clarification and/or integration 
of Identity and Social Identity Theory. Both theories could be advanced if scholars 
engage in explanations that address inconsistencies of the subjective projection of 
reality accompanied by the imposition of objective realities. Engaging in points of 
inconsistency will advance understandings.  
 
A third implication 
Implicit in our creation of this paper is an implication that, as scholars of 
organisational phenomena, we need to better understand the salience construct. We 
believe salience is a central idea in both SIT and IT, addressing questions such as 
whether an identity is triggered by objects of salience or if the active identity 
determines which objects of salience gain attention. Moreover, if identity and 
identification are truly ‘root’ constructs, it follows that salience is a central idea for 
most every line of literature in micro-organisational theory.  
 
In this paper, we have provided an initial framework for understanding and applying 
the salience construct. We urge scholars to engage the construct of salience. As a 
start, what follows is a set of propositions stemming from our framework that can be 
improved through further analytical review and empirical testing.  
 
Proposition 1: Salience is the existence of a connection between a stimulus 
and a person 
Proposition 2: The form of salient connection is iterative (that is, connections 
between stimuli and person change from moment to moment) 
Proposition 3: The moment of the salient connection between a stimulus and a 
person is singular to that stimulus and that person (that is, two 
salient connections cannot occur at the exact same moment of 
time)  
 33
Proposition 4: The nature of the salient connection varies according to whether 
a subjective or objective point of view is taken 
 
CONCLUSION 
Salience has been used in unclear, inconsistent, and undefined ways in identity-
related literature. To begin a process of clarification, we propose a starting definition 
of salience that encompasses its temporal nature, the phenomenon of salience as a 
connection and the possible objective to subjective perspectives toward salience. 
Drawing on a range of literatures, we identified uses and elements of salience and 
developed an ontological framework to assist with analysing the use of salience in 
literature and theory. Use of the framework showed that Identity Theory and Social 
Identity Theory used salience in unclear and inconsistent ways. Although each theory 
has an underlying understanding of salience as connection, this can be lost amongst 
their imprecise use and overuse of the construct. We urge precision in the use of 
salience and suggest its use is accompanied by defining the elements of salience 
and considering the ontological perspective taken.  
 
This paper proposes a fresh analytical perspective for examining how people 
interact with the stimuli in their world. The proposed definition and framework are 
only a starting point, and the research propositions suggest directions for testing, 
developing and advancing our understanding of the phenomenon of salience. Such 
an advance holds promise for the identity-related literature and beyond.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. To draw out the differences in these three perspectives, we thought it useful to use 
examples from just one literature. 
 
2. 1Unlike the previous set of examples, in this set we decided to employ a wide 
range of literatures, thus providing a broad review across literatures that, often 
implicitly, rely upon the salience construct. 
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